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Purpose:  The thesis purpose is to examine the determinants of banks’ capital 
structure with a more concentration on Asian countries. Moreover, 
it is of our interest to exploit the potential difference between the 
leverage ratios as well as influence of such factors on 
corresponding leverage ratios of banks in two classified groups of 
developed and developing countries.  
Methodology:  Significances of variables are tested by estimating the multiple 
regression models on panel data with assistance of Eviews 7. 
Theoretical perspective:  Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem, static trade-off theory, 
agency theory, pecking order theory, market timing theory. 
Empirical foundation:  The data are from 61 banks from 10 Asian countries (5 developed 
and 5 developing countries) from 2000 to 2012. Thomson Reuters’ 
Datastream, World Bank, Central Intelligence Agency World 
Factbook and KPMG databases are the primary data sources. 
Conclusions:  Our paper highlights the importance of firm-specific determinants 
as compared to macroeconomic factors on capital structure 
decision of banks. We also refer that the stage of economic 
development of a country should be taken into account when 
drafting policies monitoring banks’ operation. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1.  Background 
The recent 2007/08 financial crisis is considered as the worst one since the Great 
Depression in 1930s. Originated from the US subprime mortgage meltdown, its consequences 
were so severe: the stock markets around the world fell as emergency, many large financial 
institutions have collapsed or been bought out, governments of even the most advanced 
economies had to implement various rescue packages to save their financial systems. Investment 
banks – as direct participants in mortgage-backed securities transactions - were most heavily 
affected by the crisis. The industry saw the buyouts of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch 
by Bank of America, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, all of which are amongst the US biggest 
investment banks. However, it is not only the investment banks but the whole banking system 
and entire economy suffered. Banks facing massive losses lack confidence in lending and also 
under legislative pressure would hold more reserves, firms face difficulties when having to 
finance their operation with more restricted and expensive loans, leading to job cuts, to name a 
few.  
With its crucial role in affecting the entire economy, banking sector is more regulated 
than any other industries, where supervision under Basel Accords is most frequently mentioned. 
Issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Basel Accords are voluntary 
regulatory standards on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity risk. As reform 
measures against the deficiencies in financial regulations revealed from the 2007/08 crisis, Basel 
III was installed in January 2013. Its aims are to improve the banking sector's ability to absorb 
shocks arising from financial and economic stress, improve risk management and governance 
and strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures. 
“The world is flat”! In this era of globalization, there are always knock-on effects, that is 
why the 2007/08 financial crisis is also referred to as the 2007/08 Global Crisis. Many Asian 
countries have also seen falls in stock market, depreciation of currency values, slowdown in 
economic growth, increasing unemployment, etc. Interestingly, as found by Mohanty and Tumer 
(2010), not sharing the same ailing situation with many US and European banks, most of Asian 
banks responded to the crisis quite well. As per Gochoco-Bautista (2008), no banks or financial 
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institutions were in threat of nationalization or recapitalization. Mentioned in Stevens, Ekberg 
and Kim (2012, Exhibit 1), return on equity and revenue of Asian banks during and after the 
crisis from 2007 to 2009 are all well above the industry growth. Asian banking sector has been 
better immunized from the financial crisis, as can be said. 
1.2 Problem discussion  
Bank leverage ratio and the probability of crisis are closely related. As per finding by 
Mooij et al (2013), excessive bank leverage has fueled the banking crisis.  It signifies the 
importance of studying about capital structure and its determinants so that regulatory authorities 
can impose a closer supervision on banks, ensuring financial stability in the banking sector.   
Ever since the emergence of Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theorem, capital 
structure has been the focus of empirical researches in the field of corporate finance. What 
determines capital structure of firms is still an intriguing question for economists and 
researchers.   Despite the fact that this is a very well-researched field, previous researches have 
mostly focused on non-financial firms, not many on that of financial institutions in general and 
banks specifically. This paper is expected to be an additional contribution to the study field on 
determinants of banks’ capital structure, with more focus on Asian economies. 
1.2.1. Difference in the capital structure of non-financial firms and banks  
Banks and non-financial firms have significant variations in operational systems which 
result in their different capital structures. Banks are found to have significantly high leverage 
ratios as opposed to all companies operating in non-financial fields. There are many reasons for 
this disparity. 
A very distinct characteristic as compared to firms is that banks need to follow certain 
rules and regulations as a hedge against fluctuations in their financial positions. Specifically, 
minimum capital requirement is imposed on banks as to how they should handle their assets in 
relation to their capital mix. Moreover, capital requirement is closely related to deposit 
insurance. As per McCoy (2008), deposit insurance can significantly reduce the incidence of 
bank runs, protecting benefits of depositors on one hand. On the other hand, if not implemented 
properly, deposit insurance can give banks incentives to take unnecessary risks. Making deposits 
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safer provides banks a very cheap source of financing, encouraging them to borrow more and 
maybe engage in more risky investments. In light of this, banks are required to hold a minimum 
capital to alleviate the moral hazard of this insurance, reducing their flexibility in capital mix.  
While there is no such restriction on non-financial firms, they can optimize their capital structure 
in the way that they prefer.  
As highlighted by Raheman, Zulfiqar and Mustafa (2007), another major difference in the 
capital structure of banks and non-financial firms comes from preference of debts. For firms, 
profitability and bankruptcy costs influence their preference of debts. Provided with tax shield, 
firms prefer debts, especially profitable firms which have a lower risk of bankruptcy hence they 
can more comfortably add on debts into their capital mix. On the other hand, a firm with lower 
profit will have to face higher risk of bankruptcy if highly leveraged so it will choose to depend 
less on debts. Banks have less choice but must rely on debts, most of which come from deposits 
as one of the major and cheapest sources of funds to ensure their smooth ongoing operation. 
Irrespective of the preference of debt or equity, banks have to rely on debts for their financial 
needs. Furthermore, agency theory also explains the higher leverage of banks’ compared to 
nonfinancial firms. Flannery (1994) states that banks usually invest in assets that are more 
complicated to understand for the outsiders and have various opportunities for assets 
substitution. This will increase the cost of issuing equity due to information asymmetry 
problems, making banks prefer debt over equity. He also mentions that short-term debts can help 
discipline the banks’ managers through the risk of liquidity and mismatched maturities. Banks, 
therefore, will prefer debt to discipline manager and mitigate agency cost. 
      The difference is also originated from investment opportunities and liquidity. A firm with 
high investment opportunities, by investing in profitable projects and using retained earnings 
instead of debts to fulfill its financial needs, can lower its leverage. On the contrary, despite the 
investment opportunities available, a bank still has to rely on high level of debt to fund its 
ongoing and main business of lending.  Firms can also alter their capital structure preferences 
depending upon their duration of financial requirements.  They can determine the minimum cost 
of capital in accordance to their financial needs, which corresponds to either short-term or long-
term capital and prefer either debt or equity accordingly. Banks are different. They have to cater 
to borrowers’ needs of loans whenever needed, be it short-term or long-term. Accordingly, they 
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must comprise their capital mix from debts, both short-term and long-term to balance their 
liquidity position. Also according to Diamond & Rajan (2001), banks have a volatile capital 
structure as opposed to the non-financial firms that have a more stable capital mix. Banks have 
volatility in their capital structure to ensure their liquidity, enabling them to channel loans that 
are less liquid while raising more deposits that have higher liquidity levels. 
These are good reasons to believe that banks’ capital structure should not be determined 
by the same factors as those of non-financial firms; or if the significance of these determinants 
holds, their sign and magnitude may change. Holding these beliefs, we decided to study the 
specific determinants of banks’ capital structure in more depth, hoping to contribute some more 
findings to the research field of bank capital structure. 
1.2.2. Difference in determinants of banks’ capital structure between developed and 
developing countries  
 After narrowing down our concentration on banking sector specifically, we came up with a 
range of conflicting beliefs as to the difference in capital structure of the banks in different 
economies. On the global basis, there is a big gap between banks’ capital ratios in developed and 
developing countries. As per the data from World Bank from 2003 to 2011, capital ratio of banks 
in high income economies is on average lower than that of low and middle income countries, 
implying an inverse conclusion of leverage ratio accordingly. 
Figure 1: Comparison between banks’ capital ratio in low and middle income and high 
income from 2003 to 2011 
    Source: World Bank 
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Banking organizations compete in the same industry and thus are subject to more or less 
the same business-level forces. The variation in their capital mix may be due to country-specific 
factors like differing inflation, GDP growth, economic structure, government systems, etc. These 
macroeconomic factors might affect the capital structure of banks in a different way depending 
upon the stage of economic development of a country. Rajan et al (1995) mentioned a research 
by Goldsmith stating that “a rough parallelism can be observed between economic and financial 
development” and “there are even indications in the few countries for which data are available 
that periods of more rapid economic growth have been accompanied, though not without 
exception, by an above-average rate of financial development." This suggests that different 
economic stages might have difference financial structures. Brown and Octivia (2010) also state 
that macroeconomic factors potentially reflect the environment in which banks operate, 
contemplating the fact that banks’ capital requirement is impacted by the pro-cyclicality of these 
indicators.  Hence banks are more prone to the prevailing systematic factors and these may 
influence the decision of the banks’ capital mix. This encouraged us to study the potential 
difference of leverage ratios and significance of determinants – both internal and external factors 
on banks’ capital structure decision amongst two groups, i.e. developed and developing 
economies. 
1.3. Purpose of the paper 
Above all, we would like to find the answers to three main research questions: 
 Are banks’ capital structures different between developed and developing countries? 
 What are the determinants of banks’ capital structure? 
 Are the determinants of banks’ capital structures different between developed and 
developing countries? 
Our aim is to seek for statistical evidence as well as a proper explanation for such result 
from an economic viewpoint.  
1.4. Delimitation 
Related studies that have been done are mainly dedicated to developed economies, 
leaving unfilled gap for developing ones, specifically those located in Asia. As per the data by 
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World Bank, up to 2011, the Asian economy comprised nearly 4.3 people billion living in 52 
different states, accounting for more than 60% of the world population
1
. In terms of economic 
growth, Asia is the world's fastest growing region. As a very limited number of researches on 
determinants of banks’ capital structure have been conducted on such an important economic 
region, we would like to focus our paper precisely on Asia. Due to information scarcity, choice 
of countries and choice of banks to be included in the sample depend on data availability. 
Moreover, for easier access of data, we only included publicly traded banks into the examined 
sample. 
The thesis covers the 13 first years of the 21
st
 century, i.e. from 2000 to the most recent 
year 2012. Including both economic boom in 2000 and crisis in 2007-2008, we expect that the 
period can, to some extent, reflect a proper economic cycle. Although the economic boom started 
from 1995, we only included year 2000 due to data limitation from 1999 backwards.   
1.5. Disposition  
The thesis starts with Chapter 2 of Theoretical framework and previous researches, 
introducing the reader to the previous related theories and studies regarding determinants of 
capital structure, on both firms in general and banks specifically. It is recapped with related 
hypotheses and findings, which are the foundation for our empirical study in later chapters. The 
variable choices and definitions are presented under Chapter 3. Later, we describe the data with a 
presentation of how the sample is selected and the methodology used in conducting the tests. 
Results are presented in the following chapter 5 of Empirical findings with more detailed 
analysis and explanation. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the results, believing our paper 
would be of interest for further studies and of some contribution to decisions of banks’ managers 
and policymakers. 
2. Theoretical framework and previous researches 
2.1.  Capital structure theories 
  The Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem (“M&M theorem”) (1958) is the keystone for 
the later theories contributing to today’s corporate finance in general and for studies on capital 
                                                          
1
 Refer to Appendix I: List of countries by population 2011 
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structure determinants specifically. This theorem, referred to as irrelevance proposition, suggests 
that a firm’s financing decision has no effect on its value.  In other words, value of the firm 
depends on the income generated by its assets, not by how the assets are financed or how the 
income is divided. It is the conclusion held in “a perfect world”, where four main assumptions 
are required: no corporate taxes, no bankruptcy costs, no information asymmetry and no agency 
costs. The theorem is considered flawed when being applied to reality – “an imperfect world”. 
Subsequent theories have been developed, taking into account the market imperfections by 
relaxing those restrictive assumptions. These theories include the extended M&M theorem 
(1963) which considers corporate taxes in light of benefits brought by tax shields, static trade-off 
theory which weigh such tax shield benefits against the bankruptcy costs, agency theory which 
relaxes the assumption of no agency costs and pecking order theory and market timing theory 
which study impacts of information asymmetry problems on capital structure decisions. 
  Bank is considered as a very special firm - the only financial institution licensed as a 
receiver of deposits. Being a firm, all capital structure related theories applicable to firms should 
also be applicable to a bank. Being a special firm, there should be some special application of 
these theories to a bank. 
2.1.1. M&M irrelevance theorem 
(i) M&M theorem – no taxes case (1958)  
The theorem has two propositions relevant to capital structure topic. As concluded from 
Proposition I, the value of the leveraged firm is equal to the value of the unleveraged firm. It 
implies that a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant; and its weighted average cost of capital 
(“WACC”) is the same no matter what mixture of debt and equity used to finance the firm is. 
Proposition II refers that the cost of equity rises as the firm increases its use of debt 
financing, depicting the risk of equity depends on two things: the riskiness of the firm’s 
operations (business risk) and the degree of financial leverage (financial risk). 
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(ii) M&M theorem - with corporate taxes (1963) 
In 1963, M&M theorem was further extended when relaxing the assumption of no 
corporate taxes. With respect to taxes, interest payments on debts are deductible expenses and 
thus reduce taxes payable, improving the firm’s net income position. Following that, the value of 
the leveraged firm is equal to the value of the unleveraged firm plus the present value of the 
interest tax shield. It implies that debt financing is highly advantageous and in the extreme, a 
firm’s optimal capital structure is 100% debt since its WACC decreases with the increase of debt 
financing. This may refer the important role of corporate taxes in capital structure decisions of all 
profit-generating entities, among which banks are not exception. 
2.1.2. Agency theory 
  The theory captures the effect of agency costs, i.e. costs due to conflicts of interest among 
agents. There have been a number of researches on the models in which capital structure is 
driven by agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) study on earlier work of Fama and Miller 
(1972) was the pioneer research on this topic. They proposed that these costs arise due to conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders, who both desire for self-benefit maximization. 
Managers have a very little claim on the profit of the company yet they are fully responsible for 
all the profit engineering activities. Hence they have a lesser incentive to utilize the resources 
fully for generating profit but transfer these resources to their own benefits. As pointed out by 
Jensen (1986), debts can be used as a correction tool to mitigate the agency costs of managerial 
discretion. The reason is that when requiring the firm to pay out cash on a regular basis, debts 
can helps decrease the amount of “free” cash accessible by managers to spend on their personal 
benefits.  
  Additional conflicts of interest are between shareholder and debt holder, whose costs are 
called agency costs of debt. Myer (1977) argues that a firm could incur deadweight costs when a 
company has a profitable investment opportunity which must be financed by equity, provided an 
outstanding default-risky debt. In this case, if the residual benefits to shareholders are lower than 
the project’s costs after being transferred to debt holders, managers will not adopt the project 
even if it is profitable. It is so-called the underinvestment problem, arising when managers, 
acting in the interest of shareholders, may take actions that appropriate wealth from debt holders 
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to shareholders. This implies that leverage has a negative relation with the growth opportunities 
of the firms. 
  Grossman and Hart (1982) introduces the term “bankruptcy cost to the managers”, 
including loss of job, loss of position and fear of takeover. It motivates managers to work harder 
towards efficient allocation of resources and investing in higher profitable activities, reducing the 
conflict with the equity holders. This alleviates the divergences between managers and equity 
holders, one more time asserting the benefit of debt financing. From that, they concluded that 
leverage is positively related with the value of the firm. 
  The agency theory is also well applicable to bank capital structure, for which we would 
exploit later in our further analysis. 
2.1.3. Static trade-off theory 
Static trade-off theory negates the assumption of no bankruptcy costs, the increased costs 
of debt financing that result from the higher probability of bankruptcy. These bankruptcy costs 
include both direct costs (such as legal and administration costs) and indirect costs – difficulties 
that a company has to suffer when under financial distress like loss of reputation, loss of 
bargaining power, etc. Bankruptcy costs can significantly affect a company’s cost of capital, 
hence are important in determining and making changes to its capital structure. 
M&M theorem (1963) refers that the optimal capital structure is 100% debt as interest on 
debt is a deductible expense, creating a tax shield for the firm. To argue this, Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) develops the theory of optimal leverage ratio in which the trade-off between 
costs and benefits of taxes when decision of debt financing is considered. Borrowing saves the 
firm money on its corporate taxes, but the more it borrows, the more likely it will go bankrupt. 
At the relatively low debt levels, the probability of bankruptcy and financial distress is low; 
hence the benefits of tax shield from debt may outweigh the costs. Nonetheless, at the very high 
debt level, tax advantage of debts may be offset by the bankruptcy costs. This is the main idea of 
static trade-off theory of capital structure, saying that firms borrow up to the point where 
marginal benefits of tax shield should be higher than marginal bankruptcy costs. 
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 Besides, there are more costs and benefits involved with the use of debt and equity such 
as agency costs as mentioned earlier. Incorporating agency costs into the static trade-off theory, 
capital structure is determined by balancing the trade-off between tax benefits against bankruptcy 
costs, and between benefits of debt when mitigating agency costs of managerial discretion 
against agency costs of debt arising from asset substitution effect. 
 Regarding its application to capital structure determinants, trade-off theory suggests a 
positive correlation between firm’s profitability and size and its leverage ratio. Believing a 
profitable and large firm would be in less danger of bankruptcy, it is supposed to rely more on 
debt financing to take advantage of tax benefits. Moreover, profitable firms face higher agency 
costs of managerial discretion, hence likely would be interested in debt contracts as a mitigation 
tool. 
 Being businesses with distinctly high leverage ratios, banks are supposed to have higher 
probability of bankruptcy. Other than that, banks are closely regulated on their minimum capital 
requirement, lowering the chance of insolvency. Hence, the trade-off between costs and benefits 
of debt financing is still highlighted to banks yet somehow different from its application to non-
financial firms. 
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2.1.4. Pecking order theory  
  The pecking order theory addresses asymmetric information which can create a hierarchy 
of costs for the companies that use external financing. Accordingly, new investments are 
preferably financed first by retained earnings, followed by debts and then lastly equities given 
the increasing cost of capital respectively. From that, pecking order theory suggests a negative 
impact of profitability on leverage.  It implies that a less profitable firm with a weak internal cash 
flow when having profitable investment opportunities would be more likely to use external fund 
given its limited retentions.  
  It further suggests that firms do not have leverage targets. They use debts only when 
retained earnings are insufficient and only raise external equity capital only as the last resort. 
Another model based on the idea of managerial optimism by Heaton (2002) shows that pecking 
order preferences can vary depending upon the optimism levels of the managers. Yueh-hsiang et 
al. (2005) also suggests that the sensitivity of the net debt issues relative to financing deficits for 
optimistic managers is larger than those for less optimistic ones. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
suggests that managers could minimize the cost of capital by timing the market (issuing equity 
when share prices increase) implying that market conditions influence the pecking order. 
  Economists often refer moral hazard as a special case of information asymmetry – “any 
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone 
else bears the cost if things go badly”, as defined by Krugman (2009). In banking sector, moral 
hazard problem is closely related to deposit insurance. McCoy (2008) mentions two types of 
deposit insurance, namely implicit and explicit ones. Most governments are reluctant to allow 
bank insolvency without some compensation to depositors. Thus they extend depositors some 
kind of financial safety net, signaling implicit guarantees by bailing out failed banks and thereby 
sending a message that other bailouts would be available in case of future bankruptcy. The 
explicit deposit insurance, as suggested by its name, is a more formal commitment to guarantee 
deposits, usually through legislation. Deposits being insured would not require much risk 
premium, hence reduce borrowing costs for banks. To mitigate the moral hazard of such 
insurance, banks are required to hold a minimum amount of capital, limiting their capital mix 
flexibility. This implies a quite apparent relation between asset risks and banks’ capital structure. 
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2.1.5. Market timing theory 
  Market timing theory also closely studies the information asymmetry. It refers to the 
practice that firms issues equities when the shares are believed to be overvalued and inversely, 
implement repurchase when shares are undervalued. There are two versions as follows. 
  The first is the dynamic version by Myers and Majluf (1984), assuming rational 
economic agents (i.e. managers and investors). Korajczyk et al. (1991) finds that with the 
existence of adverse selection costs, firms tend to issue equities following a positive information 
release so that information asymmetry between investors and managers is reduced, resulting in 
increasing stock price. Hence, firm could create its own timing opportunity. The extent of 
adverse selection varies across firms (as per Lucas and McDonald (1990), Korajczyk, Lucas and 
McDonald (1992)) and across time (as per Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993)) and negatively 
related to market-to-book (“M/B”) ratio.  
  The second version by Baker and Wurgler (2002) assumes irrational economic agents, 
leading to a time-varying mispricing of the firm’s stock. It is the case when managers believe 
that they can time the market, so issue equities when they believe shares are at high price and 
repurchase when believing shares are at low price. Accordingly, variation in M/B ratio comes 
from managers’ perception of misevaluation. Hence, both versions of market timing theory are 
expected to explain the potential relation between M/B and capital structure. 
  Managers’ belief that they can time the market was evidenced in the survey by Graham 
and Harvey (2001). However, two market timing versions of dynamic asymmetric information 
and mispricing cannot be distinguished. Above all, after taking into account results of various 
researches, Baker and Wurgler (2002) concludes that there is no optimal capital structure, but 
capital structure only evolves as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity 
market. 
  With our sample of all publicly-traded banks, the market timing theory is expected to 
help explain any changes in banks’ preference of equity financing and thus their capital 
structures as well. 
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2.2. Capital structure theories as basis for previous researches 
2.2.1. Previous researches on determinants of capital structure  
Numerous works have been conducted, trying to explain choice and determinants of 
capital structure, which has been quite a focused field in corporate finance since the founding 
work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Many of the earlier empirical researches also have 
focused on testing the validity of the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the agency 
cost theory. 
  A very well-known research conducted by Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggests that there 
exists a negative relation between growth opportunities and the level of leverage. This is also 
supported by the theoretical predictions of Jensen and Mekling (1976) focusing on agency 
theory, and the work of Myers (1977), who argued that because of information asymmetries, 
those companies that have a higher leverage would entail a higher tendency of giving up 
investment opportunities with a positive net present value. Alternatively, Myers (1977) also 
concludes that those specific companies with a higher growth ratio will tend to have lower 
leverage. These papers also suggest that profitability also has a negative relationship with the 
leverage of the company. 
Booth et al. (2001) evaluates the determinants capital structure theory across countries 
with diverse institutional structures. They collected data from 10 developing and the G7 
countries between 1980 and 1991, and concluded that there is a constant relationship between 
profitability, asset tangibility, growth options and leverage for each country.  
Another research conducted by Chen (2004) on Chinese listed companies using panel 
data accomplishes that the capital structure choices of these companies depend upon a “New 
Pecking Order” model (retained earnings, equity, long-term debt) because of distinctive legal 
restrictions. These companies rely heavily on short-term financing, and managers prefer equity 
financing to debt financing. 
Mainly the empirical researches on capital structure focus on the determinants of 
corporate debt ratios such as Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1996) and studies of issuing 
firms’ debt versus equity financing choice namely Marsh (1982), Jalilv and Harris (1984), 
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Bayless and Chaplinsky (1990), etc. These studies have concluded that firm characteristics 
including size, market-to-book ratio of assets, stock returns, asset tangibility, profitability and the 
marginal tax rate play a significant role in determining corporate financing choices, especially 
profitability and market-to-book ratio. These are so-called standard determinants of capital 
structure. 
So far developed countries have been the focus of researches like study by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) on G-7 countries, Sheridan Titaman and Roberto Wessels (1998) on USA, 
Bevan and Danbolt (2000 and 2002) on UK, Alberto de Miguel and Julio Pindado (2001) on 
Spanish firms, Al-Sakran (2001) on Saudi Arabia, Antoniou et al. (2002) on UK, Germany, and 
France, Hall et al. (2004) on European small and medium enterprises, F Bancel and UR Mittoo 
(2004) on European countries, etc. Fewer studies examine developing countries, namely Booth et 
al. (2001) study on ten developing countries
2
, Pandey (2001) on Malaysia, Omet and 
Mashharawe (2001) on Jordan, Chen (2004) on China. Among these, some have used cross-
country comparisons based on data from Asia like Deesomsak et al. (2004) on Asia Pacific 
region. 
2.2.2. Previous researches on determinants of banks’ capital structure  
Most of the previous researches on determinants of capital structure examined non-
financial firms; meanwhile there were just some studies on banks to date. 
A well-cited paper by Gropp and Heider (2007) studies the 200 largest publicly-traded 
commercial banks and bank holding companies in the US and 15 EU developed countries
3
 
during the period from 1991 to 2004. Using results from empirical researches on capital structure 
determinants of non-financial firms, it tries to explain the fact that leverage is much higher in 
banks compared to firms. The standard determinants of capital structure for firms are found to be 
still applicable in explaining banks’ capital mix decision. Interestingly, statutory capital 
requirement, which is believed to have great influence, is not supported as an explanation for the 
variation in bank capital. Also Gropp and Heider did not find a significant effect of deposit 
                                                          
2
 10 developing countries are Brazil, Mexico, India, South Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and 
Zimbabwe 
3
 15 EU countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. 
MSC THESIS [DETERMINANTS OF BANK CAPITAL STRUCTURE] 
 
Spring 2013 Page 19 
 
insurance coverage on banks’ capital structure. Among some examined macroeconomic factors, 
Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) growth is not statistically significant. 
Following this, Octavia and Brown (2010) examines determinants of bank capital 
structure in developing countries and made a brief comparison with the result from Gropp and 
Heider’s paper. The sample includes 56 publicly commercial banks from 10 developing 
countries
4
 between 1996 and 2005. The result that standard determinants are significant in 
explaining variation in bank capital still holds, for both banks’ book and market capital. The 
impact of minimum capital requirement cannot be confirmed due to the mixed outcome when 
analyzing book and market leverage. The influence of macroeconomic factors is inclusive due to 
conflicting results when examining book and market leverage. 
Brewer III, Kaufman and Wall (2008) also conducted studies on 78 largest private banks 
headquartered in 12 industrial countries
5
 in the period 1992-2005. They tried to explain why 
bank capital ratios vary across these developed countries and concluded that the differences may 
be in part explained by public policy and regulatory regimes of each country. Most of bank 
specific variables, above all, still have the most explanatory power. 
Studies by Adrian and Shin (2008 and 2009) and Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin 
(2008) conclude that the biggest banks do not handle their capital structure based on regulatory 
constraints but more focused on internal value at risk. According to them the financial 
intermediaries try to maximize earning while maintaining more or less a constant risk exposure. 
So they conclude that leverage for banks is high in high growth period due to lower perceived 
risk and vice versa. 
Besides, there were some other papers also trying to explain the relationship between 
banks’ capital ratio and standard determinants in specific countries separately such as Wong, 
Choi and Fong (2005) on banks in Hong Kong, Williams (2011) on banks in Nigeria, Romdhane 
(2012) on banks in Tunisia, Çağlayan and Şak (2010) on banks in Turkey, Amidu (2007) on 
banks in Ghana, etc but not very comprehensive. They failed to explain the possible reasons for 
sign and magnitude of the relationship between the examined factors and the capital ratio. 
                                                          
4
 10 developing countries include Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and 
Zimbabwe. 
5
 12 industrial countries are US, Australia, Ireland, UK, Italy, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, France, 
Netherlands and Germany. 
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3. Variable choices and definitions  
3.1. Leverage ratio as dependent variable 
As defined by Ronald, Merle and Edgar (1996), capital structure is the ratio of long-term 
debts over equity. This definition has been used consistently in previous researches on capital 
structure decision of firms in general. 
However, the nature of debts in banks is very different from other non-financial firms. 
For firms, the majority of debts are the loans borrowed from banks, most of which are long-term 
loans. The main source of banks’ debts, on the other hand, is from deposits, which are more of 
short-term nature (transaction accounts). Hence, it would be inadequate if we just follow the 
aforesaid definition of capital structure used to analyze non-bank firms. Considering this, the 
dependent variable of leverage ratio in our paper is referred to as Total Debts over Total Assets 
consistently. The leverage ratios of our interest include both book and market leverage, where we 
take into account the book and market value of equity respectively, assuming book value of debt 
constant. 
3.2. Independent variables 
Regarding regressants, we start from related theories and previous empirical researches to 
determine which variables potentially have explanatory power on capital structure of banks. Both 
internal and external factors which are likely to affect banks’ capital decisions are taken into 
account. We followed Gropp and Heider (2007) in our definition of most variables, which is 
originally referred from Frank and Goyal (2004). There are some minor changes in calculation 
method but the nature of variables is unchanged. 
6
 
3.2.1. Bank-level determinants 
  The internal factors are selected based on past empirical studies on determinants of 
capital ratio of firms in general and of banks specifically, including collateral, dividend, size, 
asset risk, M/B and profit.  
 
                                                          
6
 Refer to Appendix III: Definition of variables 
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(i) Collateral 
  From the perspective of trade-off theory and agency theory, tangible assets as collateral 
help reduce the financial distress costs and agency costs of debt, hence increase the leverage 
capacity for firms. Such anticipation of positive relationship between collateral and leverage 
ratio has been confirmed consistently in studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2005), etc. The opposite 
conclusion of inverse relationship between collateral and capital structure was made by Pandey 
(2001), Correa et al. (2007), Mazur (2007), Mitton (2008), Ullah and Nishat (2008).  
  Gropp and Heider (2007) and Octavia and Brown (2010) (Herein after also referred to as 
“two previous papers on banks’ capital structure” interchangeably) have opposite conclusion on 
this, where Gropp and Heider only a negative relation between collateral and leverage whilst 
Octavia and Brown concluded a statistical insignificance. 
(ii) Dividend 
A dividend-paying company which is large and mature can rely on its reputation to raise 
external capital, hence would reduce borrowing. Frank and Goyal (2005) finds this negative 
relation between dividend and leverage. 
  According to Gropp and Heider (2007), banks face a higher cost of issuing equity due to 
asymmetric information. Those banks that indulge in paying dividends are expected to face 
lower cost of issuing equity as they are well known to the outsiders, preferring equity financing. 
They also concluded a negative relationship between dividend and leverage ratio, while Octavia 
and Brown (2010) could not conclude due to mixed results when examining book and market 
leverage. 
(iii) Size 
In accordance to trade-off theory, large firms with lower bankruptcy costs and more 
stable cash flow would have higher capacity for debt financing. This positive relationship 
between size and leverage is also concluded from researches by Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Booth et al. (2001), Aggarwal and Jamdee (2003) and and Frank and Goyal (2005). 
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The contradictory conclusion of inverse relationship comes from information asymmetry 
problem. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argues that large firms are usually required to disclose more 
information to the public, increasing its transparency, reducing information asymmetry costs 
hence would favor equity financing. Chen (2004) further explains this by referring to large 
companies’ reputation and attraction to equity market.  
  Two previous papers on banks’ capital structure had the same conclusion as the first 
argument of a positive relation. 
(iv) Asset risk 
Increasing asset risk increases the default probability, hence would reduce the firm’s 
preference in borrowing as suggested by trade-off theory. Such negative correlation between risk 
and leverage was also concluded in Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), 
Pandey (2001) and Ullah and Nishat (2008), emphasizing that risky firms will use less debt. 
  Besides, given its very unique characteristics, banking industry is specifically controlled 
by the statutory minimum capital requirement set by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
internationally and by the local Central Bank in respective countries. The relation between asset 
risk and banks’ capital structure is expected to be significant, for which two previous papers on 
banks’ capital structure also had the same conclusion of a negative relation. 
(v) M/B 
  From the viewpoint of pecking order theory, a firm with high M/B ratio has high 
financial capacity from its operation, thus would rely more on its internal capital not debt. 
According to market timing theory, believing its share price is high, the firm’s management 
would issue shares if in need of capital. These arguments support an inverse relationship between 
M/B and leverage, which has also been concluded in Rajan and Zingales (1995), Aggarwal and 
Jamdee (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2005). On the other hand, if based on trade-off theory for 
argument, high M/B implies a profitable firm which can rely more on debts without too much 
concern on its solvency. Therefore we also have reasons to expect a positive correlation. 
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  Gropp and Heider (2007) indicates a negative correlation while and Octavia and Brown 
(2010) has mixed conclusion in terms of signs of effects when examining book and market 
leverage. 
(vi) Profit 
Implied from M&M theorem (1963) when taking corporate taxes into account, firms 
would prefer debt given tax shield benefits. Further with static trade-off theory, provided lesser 
chance of bankruptcy, a profitable firm would carry on more debt compared to a less profit-
generating one. Additionally, agency theory suggests that a profitable firm would increase debt 
to mitigate the agency costs of managerial discretion. All of these refer a positive association 
between profitability and leverage. 
Alternatively, pecking order theory emphasizes that a profit firm will prioritize to use its 
retained earnings first, not debts. This implies a negative relationship, which is consistent with 
many previous studies like Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al (2001), Aggarwal and Jamdee 
(2003) and Frank and Goyal (2005). Besides, Chen (2004) further justifies the negative 
relationship as a mitigation tool for the underinvestment problem and mispricing of new projects. 
This is also result of two previous papers on banks’ capital structure. 
3.2.2.  Country-level determinants  
We would also include macroeconomic variables which are believed to have effects on 
banks’ capital ratio, including Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) growth, inflation, stock market 
risk, term structure spread and tax rate. 
(i) GDP growth 
During economic downturn, due to bad performance and increase in bankruptcy costs, 
firms would hesitate to borrow. Reversely, companies would borrow more in good economic 
condition given more investment opportunities. This argument of positive association between 
GDP growth and leverage is supported by trade-off theory and matches with findings in previous 
researches by Booth et al. (2001), Deesomsak et al. (2004), de Jong et al. (2008), Mitton (2008), 
Bas et al. (2009), Nuño et al (2013), etc. 
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Gropp and Heider (2007) also concludes a positive relation, while Octavia and Brown 
(2010) finds GDP growth statistically insignificant in determining bank leverage. 
(ii) Inflation 
Inflation would add up an inflation premium to the nominal interest rate, making firms 
more hesitant in borrowing, thus lower leverage. This argument is also confirmed by findings of 
Booth et al. (2001) and Beck et al. (2008).  
On the contrary, as suggested by the trade-off theory, the tax advantage of debts will 
increase with the level of inflation. As per market timing theory, as equity becomes undervalued 
in the era of inflation, managers would not issue equity but opt to go for bank loans. These two 
theories emphasize the positive relationship between inflation and leverage, which is consistent 
with conclusion by Taggart (1986), Per (2005) and Frank and Goyal (2008). 
Its relation with banks’ capital structure is inconclusive as per Gropp and Heider (2007), 
where the test is significant when examining book leverage but insignificant for market leverage. 
(iii) Stock market risk 
Stock market risk is the potential loss due to fluctuations in the stock market of a country, 
depicting the volatility of an economy’s stock index. This is an important measure of the 
financial risk prevailing in the country. High risks make bank have to increase its reserves to 
comply with regulations on statutory capital requirements, which results in lower leverage. On 
the contrary, we can also expect a positive relation. When the market experiences high volatility, 
investors would not be confident in investing money. In this case, they may prefer keeping their 
money as deposits, increasing the banks’ leverage ratios.  
Among previous studies on bank capital structure, Octavia and Brown (2010) rejects its 
statistical significance, meanwhile Gropp and Heider (2007) concludes an inverse relation. 
(iv) Term structure spread 
Interest rates play a vital role in the banking system, directly affecting the deposits and 
loans of individual banks.  A higher term structure spread depicts a higher risk premium banks 
require when lending to customers. This suggests a negative relation between term spread and 
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firms’ leverage.  Regarding the debt ratio of banks, Gropp and Heider (2007) finds a positive 
relation indeed.   
(v) Tax rate 
Corporate tax also potentially has a significant impact on the capital ratios of banks. With 
higher levels of taxes, banks will opt to have more debts in their capital structure given the tax 
shield benefits following M&M theorem (1963). This positive relationship was also confirmed in 
Per’s paper (2005).  
In summary, the effects of all variables as concluded from previous papers and 
anticipated applying capital structure theories are summarized under Table 1. 
Table 1: Expected effects of explanatory variables on leverage ratio 
The effects may vary across different studies and among implications of different theories. 
+/-: The test is statistically significant and has positive or negative relation with leverage ratios. 
+ (-)/ Not significant: The test is statistically significant and has positive or negative relation 
with leverage ratios in one study but not significant in another study. 
Undecided: The significance tests have contradictory results when examining book leverage and 
market leverage, hence significance of the variable is inconclusive. 
Blank: Not yet examined in previous papers/ Not relevant with the theory. 
 
M&M 
theorem
Agency 
theory
Static 
trade-off 
theory
Pecking 
order 
theory
Market 
timing 
theory
Collateral +/- -/ Not significant + +
Dividend - -/ Undecided -
Size +/- + +
Asset risk - - -
M/B - -/ Undecided + - -
Profit - - + + + -
GDP growth + +/ Not significant +
Inflation +/- Undecided + +
Market risk -/ Not significant
Term structure spread Undecided
Tax + +
Bank-
level 
factors
Country-
level 
factors
Expected effects
Variable
Per previous 
studies on firms
Per previous studies 
on banks
Per theories
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4. Data and methodology  
4.1.  Data and sample selection  
4.1.1.  Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data come from four main sources. Regarding bank-level factors, all data from 
banks’ balance sheet and income statements as well as their stock price and dividend payout are 
all available in Thomson Reuters’s Datastream. The country-level determinants are, on the other 
hand, obtained from various sources including Thomson Reuters’s Datastream, World Bank, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) World Factbook and KPMG databases. For more details 
with regards to data sources, please refer to Appendix IV.
7
 
The descriptive statistics for primary variables are as follows. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Developed countries 
Size is Book value of bank assets, measured in USD. Collateral and Profit are ratios of Size. 
More details about definition of variables and data sources are under Appendix III and IV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Appendix IV: Sources of data 
Size Collateral Asset risk M/B Profit GDP growth Inflation Market risk
Term structure 
spread
Tax
 Mean 24,230,580        0.283293  0.001936  1.054721  0.001719  0.030014  0.012179  0.011629  0.025424  0.278206
 Median 17,931,989        0.281734  0.000997  0.991580  0.002712  0.036000  0.011300  0.010964  0.021167  0.275000
 Maximum 161,000,000     0.972019  0.048934  4.481954  0.136360  0.108000  0.056800  0.027558  0.072000  0.420000
 Minimum 69,677               -0.704827  0.000000  0.920481 -0.442017 -0.052 -0.0134  0.004314  0.002000  0.000000
 Std. Dev. 26,032,501        0.158187  0.003854  0.316682  0.029621  0.029321  0.016681  0.004894  0.014719  0.133399
 Obs.  349  327  349  349  349  348  377  357  323  377
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics – Developing countries 
Size is Book value of bank assets, measured in USD. Collateral and Profit are ratios of Size. 
More details about definition of variables and data sources are under Appendix III and IV. 
 
Having a closer look at mean values of the variables, it is observable that there are some 
variations in the two samples of banks in developed and developing countries as per table 4. 
Table 4: Comparing mean values of primary variables 
Size is Book value of bank assets, measured in USD. Collateral and Profit are ratios of Size. 
More details about definition of variables and data sources are under Appendix III and IV. 
 
As per Table 2 and Table 3, difference in size of banks is most apparent, where the 
largest bank is more than 2300 and 1700 times as large as the smallest banks in developed and 
developing groups respectively. Comparing between two groups in Table 4, size of banks in 
developing countries is only 44% compared to banks in developed countries on average. M/B 
Size Collateral Asset risk M/B Profit GDP growth Inflation Market risk
Term structure 
spread
Tax
 Mean 10,784,124        0.253265  0.001660  0.972341  0.010578  0.047099  0.044143  0.013388  0.039015  0.336687
 Median 3,803,704          0.250081  0.001187  0.983232  0.011205  0.052000  0.037700  0.012426  0.042000  0.350000
 Maximum 68,959,094        0.903930  0.014633  1.304470  0.078780  0.104000  0.197688  0.031679  0.072100  0.430000
 Minimum 40,204               -0.236273  0.000000  0.000000 -0.092909 -0.064 -0.008504  0.003688  0.000000  0.230000
 Std. Dev. 14,687,991        0.173354  0.001857  0.151093  0.016376  0.029899  0.042987  0.004875  0.018500  0.033134
 Obs.  382  325  373  380  380  384  410  416  336  386
Developed countries Developing countries
Size 24,230,580              10,784,124              
Collateral  0.283293  0.253265
Asset risk  0.001936  0.001660
M/B  1.054721  0.972341
Profit  0.001719  0.010578
GDP growth  0.030014  0.047099
Inflation  0.012179  0.044143
Market risk  0.011629  0.013388
Term structure spread  0.025424  0.039015
Tax  0.278206  0.336687
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ratios are both around 1 implying close relation between book value and market value of bank 
assets, however banks in developed countries are more highly valued with the ratio greater than 
1. Regarding profitability, banks in developing countries outperform with more than six times 
higher. Despite these differences, collateral ratio and asset risk of banks in two groups are 
relatively similar. 
In terms of macroeconomic factors, developing countries are more volatile markets with 
higher inflation rate and higher market risk. This is in line with the distinction in term structure 
spread, in which they have higher spread to compensate for the market instability. They also 
impose higher corporate tax rates on average. The positive side is that they have a better GDP 
growth as compared to advanced economies. 
4.1.2. Sample selection 
  We followed the classification of World Bank in categorizing countries based on their 
Gross National Income (“GNI) per capita. Following that, all Asian countries with GNI per 
capita of $12,476 or more are classified as developed countries and the rest are developing ones. 
Among the total of 52 countries and territories, there are seven countries which lie on both 
continents including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkey. For 
economic and political purposes, they are not considered or arguably to be considered as Asian 
countries, hence we excluded these seven to avoid confusion. Besides, Hong Kong and Macau as 
regions of the People's Republic of China are also not included. In summary, the list of Asia 
countries under our examination comprises of 12 developed and 31 developing countries.
8
  
  Due to data scarcity and time limitation, we could not examine the whole population of 
all banks in all Asian countries, but would only focus on a smaller sample. The sample includes 
data of 61 listed banks from ten Asian countries (consisting of five developing and five 
developed countries) from 2000 to 2012. Data in the sample, by definition, are panel data. 
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 Refer to Appendix II: List and category of Asian countries 
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Table 5: Number of banks across countries 
Category Country Banks 
Developing 
countries 
Pakistan 7 
India 6 
Thailand 7 
Sri Lanka 6 
Lebanon 6 
Total 32 
Developed 
countries 
Japan 9 
Israel 6 
Taiwan 6 
South Korea 4 
Bahrain 4 
Total 29 
 
Given the inconsistency and insufficiency of data, the selection process which is 
supposed to be on random basis, is determined by the availability of data.   
4.2.  Methodology 
4.2.1. Model specification      
The purpose of the paper is to determine which factors are statistically significant in 
explaining capital structure decision of banks, then compare if such influences are different 
among banks in two groups of economic stages. There are eleven determinants to be tested, 
including six bank-specific factors (size (Size), profits (Prof), M/B ratio (MTB), collateral (Coll), 
dividend (Div) and asset risk (AssRisk)) and five country-level variables (GDP growth rate 
(GDP), inflation rate (Infl), Term structure spread (Spread), tax rate (Tax) and market risk 
(MktRisk)). All bank-specific factors are lagged by one year to account for possible time-lagged 
temporal effects, whilst the dummy dividend and macroeconomic factors are contemporaneous. 
These variables are tested against bank leverage (Lev), including both book leverage and market 
leverage. The null and alternative hypotheses are: 
Ho: The independent variables have no explanatory power on bank leverage (βi = 0) 
Ha: The independent variables have significant explanatory power on bank leverage (βi ≠ 0)      
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The hypotheses are tested by estimating the following regression equation: 
Levi,t = α + β1ln(Sizei,t-1) + β2Profiti,t-1 + β3MTBi,t-1 + β4Colli,t-1 + β5Divit + 
β6ln(AssRiski,t-1) + β7GDPit + β8Inflit + β9Spreadit + β10Taxit + β11ln(MktRiskit) + εit          
4.2.2. Procedure 
The relationships of explanatory variables with bank capital structure would be taken into 
account by the quantitative approach. For the available data, we would run the multivariable 
regression model with the assistance of Eviews 7 to see the significance, sign and magnitude of 
each variable on leverage ratio, both book and market value.   
          To begin with, multicollinearity problem is checked to see if explanatory variables are 
highly correlated with one another. Our aim is to detect near multicollinearity (i.e. correlation 
which is higher than 0.8) via the correlation matrix. Detecting multicollinearity and solve it if 
any is important for some reasons. Firstly, highly correlated variables make it more difficult to 
observe individual contribution of each to the overall fit of the regression. As a consequence, the 
regression may “look good” with high R2 but individual variables are not significant. Secondly, 
the regression would be more sensitive to every small change in the specification, i.e. adding or 
removing a regressor would lead to large change in coefficient values or significances of other 
variables. Lastly, presence of near multicollinearity would lead to inappropriate conclusions for 
the test, reducing precision of the desired inference. The correlation matrixes are as follows. 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix – Developed countries 
 
Table 7: Correlation matrix – Developing countries 
 
As can be seen, multicollinearity problem is not observed amongst independent variables 
of the two examined samples per the above correlation matrixes. 
After checking the validity of variables, we would run the regression on dependent 
variables - book leverage and market leverage - separately. For panel data, the simplest way is to 
estimate a pooled regression on all data together. The biggest problem of pooling the data is that 
Correlation
Book 
leverage
Market 
leverage
Collateral Dividend Ln (Size)
Ln (Asset 
risk)
M/B Profit
GDP 
growth
Inflation
Ln (Market 
risk)
Term structure 
spread
Tax
Book leverage  1.000000
Market leverage  0.483301  1.000000
Collateral -0.286762 -0.131061  1.000000
Dividend  0.079609  0.183082  0.036188  1.000000
Ln (Size)  0.466463  0.317288 -0.119972  0.406447  1.000000
Ln (Asset risk) -0.416109 -0.781477  0.013208 -0.186296 -0.350076  1.000000
M/B -0.067869 -0.86771  0.031842 -0.187077 -0.112149  0.566234  1.000000
Profit -0.193275 -0.01237  0.010002  0.069011 -0.104656  0.069478 -0.070601  1.000000
GDP growth -0.185003 -0.223346 -0.136742 -0.233808 -0.261742  0.262799  0.106407  0.193885  1.000000
Inflation -0.188958 -0.165813 -0.22455 -0.338576 -0.270062  0.306052  0.056259  0.199200  0.341109  1.000000
Ln (Market risk)  0.147717  0.022117 -0.283221 -0.275849 -0.07652  0.177482  0.059006 -0.102745  0.053920  0.455932  1.000000
Term structure spread -0.525643 -0.401162  0.058030 -0.067429 -0.306366  0.429694  0.111957  0.088175  0.139590  0.245625 -0.035958  1.000000
Tax  0.536290  0.472188  0.080408  0.305119  0.545903 -0.639942 -0.167332 -0.191631 -0.470784 -0.551653 -0.104547 -0.675858  1.000000
Correlation
Book 
leverage
Market 
leverage
Collateral Dividend Ln (Size)
Ln (Asset 
risk)
M/B Profit
GDP 
growth
Inflation
Ln (Market 
risk)
Term structure 
spread
Tax
Book leverage  1.000000
Market leverage  0.488830  1.000000
Collateral  0.240102  0.394329  1.000000
Dividend -0.365145 -0.050646  0.095019  1.000000
Ln (Size)  0.381372 -0.055005  0.143437 -0.057495  1.000000
Ln (Asset risk) -0.139884 -0.584462 -0.51183 -0.073712 -0.074479  1.000000
M/B  0.457839 -0.547659 -0.15294 -0.292516  0.419906  0.429041  1.000000
Profit -0.58106 -0.304543 -0.089809  0.383128 -0.241632  0.074068 -0.23977  1.000000
GDP growth -0.012839 -0.076681  0.010736  0.148834  0.081040  0.067452  0.053742  0.107622  1.000000
Inflation  0.219576 -0.085764  0.156728  0.112893  0.238795  0.021858  0.301435  0.005707  0.178982  1.000000
Ln (Market risk)  0.151320 -0.13623 -0.100993 -0.01336  0.131317  0.308922  0.282326 -0.126536 -0.193761  0.188959  1.000000
Term structure spread  0.300855 -0.00326  0.191923 -0.091091  0.609337 -0.078073  0.291039 -0.196002  0.189371  0.113399  0.222444  1.000000
Tax  0.035200  0.211936  0.213935  0.249738 -0.389317  0.006108 -0.177857  0.129037  0.132262  0.159389  0.007884 -0.250721  1.000000
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it implicitly assumes the average values of all variables and the relationships between them are 
constant over time and cross sectionally. Therefore, we would not go for this option. In financial 
research, there are two classes of estimator approaches: fixed effects model and random effects 
models to choose when dealing with panel data. Fixed effect model removes the particular effect 
of time-invariant features to examine net effect of the explanatory variables and also takes into 
account the distinctiveness of these features by not correlating them with other individual 
characteristics. This is why fixed effects model assumes correlation between error term and 
variables. On the other hand, the rationale behind the random effects model is that the variations 
across the entities are assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
This model also allows for the time-invariant variables to be included. To examine the suitability 
of either one of these two models, we performed the Correlated Random Effects – Hausman Test 
and the Redundant Fixed Effects Tests on both data sets for developed and developing countries 
with the help of Eviews 7.  
The Correlated Random Effects – Hausman Test compares the fixed and random effects 
estimates of coefficients, in which the two hypotheses are: 
Ho: The random effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (i.e. Random 
effects model is preferred) 
Ha: The random effects are correlated with the explanatory variables (i.e. Fixed effects  
model should be applied) 
The Redundant Fixed Effects Tests test for applicability of fixed effects model. We 
choose the unrestricted specification as a two-way fixed effects estimator and Eviews will test 
the joint significance of all the effects as well as the joint significance of cross-section effects 
and the period effects separately. The hypotheses under the fixed effects testing are as follows: 
Ho: The fixed effects are redundant 
Ha: The fixed effects are not redundant 
Of note, given our data are unbalanced, tests of random-fixed or random-random effects 
on two dimensions of data are not applicable. The results are as follows. 
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Table 8: Tests for random vs fixed effects model – Developed countries 
 
Table 9: Tests for random vs fixed effects model – Developing countries 
 
As can be seen, the random effects model is not supported by any of these tests. With 
regards to tests for fixed effects, when fixed effects dummies are significant in both dimensions 
and in each dimension separately, the model using fixed effects in just one dimension is not 
valid. Therefore, our employed sample is better suited to apply the fixed effects model both in 
cross-sectional and period dimensions. Per Brooks (2008), fixed effects model is applicable 
Regressant Period dimension
Cross section 
dimension
Test applied Test result
Random None Reject Ho
None Random Reject Ho
Fixed None Reject Ho
None Fixed Reject Ho
Fixed Fixed Reject Ho
Random None Reject Ho
None Random Reject Ho
Fixed None Reject Ho
None Fixed Reject Ho
Fixed Fixed Reject Ho
Book leverage
Market 
leverage
Hausman Test
Hausman Test
Redundant Fixed 
Effects Tests
Redundant Fixed 
Effects Tests
Regressant Period dimension
Cross section 
dimension
Test applied Test result
Random None Reject Ho
None Random Reject Ho
Fixed None Not reject Ho
None Fixed Reject Ho
Fixed Fixed Reject Ho
Random None Reject Ho
None Random Reject Ho
Fixed None Not reject Ho
None Fixed Reject Ho
Fixed Fixed Reject Ho
Book leverage
Market 
leverage
Hausman Test
Hausman Test
Redundant Fixed 
Effects Tests
Redundant Fixed 
Effects Tests
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where the variables in the data sample successfully constitute the entire population. Moreover, 
cross-sectional and period fixed effect model will allow for latent firm specific and time-specific 
heterogeneity.  
Heteroscedasticity is expected to exist in the estimation process. There are several 
options to correct standard error estimates, among which heteroscedasticity-robust is most 
relevantly available in Eviews. Given we are estimating the two-dimension fixed effects model, 
the coef covariance method White diagonal is applicable. White diagonal does not actually take 
away the heteroscedasticity. It leaves the residuals (or parameter estimates) unaffected and just 
makes inference insensitive to the presence of heteroscedasticity. The results of the final 
regression after taking into account the heteroscedasticity problem would be analyzed and see if 
they can be explained by any of the above mentioned theories. 
4.3. Limitations 
For BLUE estimator, it is important that data should be collected on a random basis. 
However, data is not easily obtained and especially, data for developing countries is much more 
limited and incomprehensive. Due to that reason, apart from data which is mostly collected from 
Thomson Reuters’s Datastream, we had to supplement the missing figures from various sources 
such as World Bank, CIA Factbook and KPMG databases. We tried to consolidate and compare 
data from different sources yet some data are not consistently the same amongst these sources. 
Hence, we temporarily assume accuracy and consistency in data from these sources and use the 
collections of data which are most reasonable. When calculating term structure spread 
specifically, we could not find the prime lending rates and government bond rate of the same 
terms for all investigated countries, hence had to accept the closest data which are available.  
Moreover, difference in accounting policies and local currencies in different countries 
also threatens the consistency in data, but it is unavoidable. Regarding currency difference, we 
tried to transform most of the data into ratio. For such data which should be in absolute value, 
despite the exchange rate impact, we converted all figures into US dollar to ensure uniformity. 
Another limitation of the paper is the survivorship bias, i.e. we ignored banks which no 
longer existed until the end date of the examined period. The reason again refers to the 
availability of data, where Thomson Reuter’s Datastream only publishes data of existing 
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businesses. Therefore, there may be some reasons behind disappearance of such banks (such as 
bankruptcy, merger and acquisition) that affects the determinants of their capital structure but we 
may overlook upon exclusion of these banks from the examined sample. 
5. Empirical findings 
5.1. Comparing leverage ratios amongst banks in developed and developing countries 
Estimating the regression on both book leverage and market leverage of banks in the two 
groups, we obtained the respective leverage ratios as follows. 
Table 10: Comparison between leverage ratios amongst banks in developed and 
developing countries 
The mean values of leverage ratios (both book and market values) are tested if they are 
statistically different from each other using t-test. 
Ho: The mean values of bank leverage ratios in developed and developing countries are the 
same. 
Ha: The mean values of bank leverage ratios in developed and developing countries are 
different. 
 
 From the available data, it can be concluded that the mean values of banks’ leverage 
ratios in developed and developing countries are statistically different at 1% confidence level. So 
far we have been of the opinion that countries in each category share more or less the same 
macroeconomic conditions given their similar economic characteristics. For instance, as per 
conclusion from World Bank, GDP growth rates in developing countries are on average higher 
than those in advanced countries. Developed ones usually have high GDP levels but low GDP 
growth rates given their productivity has been optimized to the maximum level. This is also 
Developed 
countries
Developing 
countries
Test statistic p value 
Developed 
countries
Developing 
countries
Test statistic p value
Mean 0.9311 0.9196 2.917 0.0036 0.9126 0.9315 -2.589 0.0099
Median 0.9419 0.9301 0.9510 0.9536
Max 1.1554 1.1055 0.9919 1.0000
Min 0.5723 0.6992 0.2103 0.5591
Std. Dev. 0.0512 0.0547 0.1189 0.0691
Obs. 349 380 349 373
Book leverage Market leveraget-test for difference t-test for difference
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consistent with the result from our sample of Asian countries as shown in Table 4 earlier. On the 
other hand, developing countries have more potential with higher GDP growth rates but are 
negated by their comparatively fast population growth rates simultaneously. This explains GDP 
per capita growth rates in these countries to be relatively low or even negative. Since the bank-
level factors are specific to each bank, we believe that the leverage ratios in these two groups, if 
different, should be explained by the country-level determinants. So can the result of significant 
difference in the banks’ leverage ratios signify that country-level factors do have explanatory 
power on their capital structure decisions? Or is this also caused by the differing significance and 
magnitude of banks’ specific characteristics? To answer these, we would further delve deeper 
into the sign, significance and magnitude of each dependent variable on bank leverage ratios in 
the next sections. 
5.2. Comparing sign, significance and magnitude of determinants 
As per Table 11, the F-test on the combined significance of all the independent variables 
generates statistical significance at 1% confidence level. However the adjusted R
2
 is much higher 
when we estimate the regression on market leverage. 
In general, the results are quite in line with those of previous researches, where most of 
bank-level factors are significant in explaining capital structure decision of banks, meanwhile 
macroeconomic factors are less influential. When examining the dependent variable as book 
leverage and market leverage respectively, the statistical significances of variables as well as 
signs and magnitudes of the correlation are pretty consistent. For banks in developed countries, 
collateral, size, asset risk, M/B, market risk and term structure spread are statistically significant 
in explaining both book and market leverage, while dividend and GPD growth rate only have 
explanatory power on market leverage. Regarding banks in emerging countries, the results are 
totally consistent when dividend, size, asset risk, M/B, profit and tax are all statistically 
significant at 1% in explaining leverage, both book and market values. Another very noteworthy 
point is that the impacts of individual variables on banks’ leverage ratios in developed and 
developing countries share no similarity at all. 
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Table 11: Comparison of factors’ effects on bank capital structures in  
developed and developing countries 
The coefficients obtained from the significance tests against leverage ratios are tested if are 
statistically different from each other using t test. 
Ho: The impacts of independent variables on leverage ratios of banks in developed and 
developing countries are the same. 
Ha: The impacts of independent variables on leverage ratios of banks in developed and 
developing countries are different. 
*, ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and the 5% confidence level respectively. 
 
Developed 
countries
Developing 
countries
Test 
statistic
p value
Developed 
countries
Developing 
countries
Test 
statistic
p value
Collateral -0.063* 0.025 -63.911 0.000000 -0.048* 0.025 -57.545 0.000000
se 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.017
Dividend -0.006 -0.027* 40.673 0.000000 -0.008* -0.025* 34.449 0.000000
se 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007
Size 0.009* 0.006* 17.216 0.000000 0.007* 0.005** 8.614 0.000000
se 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Asset risk -0.013* -0.006* -26.501 0.000000 -0.041* -0.007* -140.625 0.000000
se 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001
M/B 0.022** 0.332* -97.783 0.000000 -0.275* -0.528* 83.588 0.000000
se 0.010 0.050 0.009 0.048
Profit -0.170 -1.217* 87.986 0.000000 0.090 -1.136* 110.733 0.000000
se 0.121 0.149 0.108 0.142
GDP growth -0.013 0.019 -4.113 0.000046 -0.127* -0.004 -16.656 0.000000
se 0.079 0.101 0.070 0.096
Inflation -0.156 0.043 -17.917 0.000000 -0.225 0.036 -26.075 0.000000
se 0.170 0.063 0.152 0.060
Market risk 0.016** 0.010 9.282 0.000000 0.029* 0.011 28.889 0.000000
se 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.009
Term structure 
spread
-1.093* 0.031 -56.150
0.000000
-1.356* 0.023 -75.506
0.000000
se 0.269 0.183 0.240 0.175
Tax 0.036 0.537* -69.625 0.000000 0.022 0.529* -74.358 0.000000
se 0.039 0.109 0.035 0.104
Constant 0.783* 0.337* 76.120 0.000000 0.996* 1.210* -39.045 0.000000
se 0.049 0.081 0.043 0.077
Number of 
observations
269 256 269 256
F-statistic 7.867 27.639 88.934 37.169
Prob
(F-statistic)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R
2 64.34% 60.47% 95.33% 90.28%
Adjusted R
2 56.16% 58.69% 94.25% 87.86%
Firm-level 
determinants
Country-level 
determinants
Variables
Book leverage Market leverage
Coefficients and standard 
errors
t-test for difference of 
coefficients
Coefficients and standard 
errors
t-test for difference of 
coefficients
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5.2.1. Bank-level determinants 
(i) Collateral 
The difference in impact of collateral on capital structure decision is pretty apparent 
between banks in two groups of countries. Collateral can only explain leverage ratios of banks in 
advanced countries, and it is an inverse relation.  
General firms with high tangibility can reduce financial distress costs and agency costs of 
debts, hence would have more capacity to increase borrowing following trade-off theory and 
agency theory. This is not applicable to banks since the Liability account of banks is mostly 
contributed by deposits from individuals and corporations, which are not likely to increase with 
the rising level of tangible assets as collateral of banks. It may explain the separation of collateral 
and leverage of banks in developing countries, especially where banks are more of the nature of 
pure commercial banks accepting deposits and lending.  
The situation in advanced economies is a little bit different, where banks have more 
operational functions like investments and insurance besides making loans. Besides cash and due 
from banks, land and building and other tangible assets, banks here have more securities, 
treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, etc as collateral. These evidence the reduced interest of 
banks in attracting deposit, which is in line with conclusion of Gropp and Heider (2007) of 
upward trend in non-deposit liabilities and downward trend in deposits of banks in US and EU. 
We are of the opinion that it explains the negative relation between collateral and leverage of 
banks in developed countries.  
(ii) Dividend 
Except for book leverage of banks in developed countries, statistical results show that 
dividend can explain change of capital structure at 1% confidence level, where the sign of effect 
is consistently negative. Information asymmetry may help explain in this regards. For listed 
banks, dividend-paying status can act as a good signal to investors about future growth of the 
banks, reducing the information asymmetry problem, thus lower the cost of issuing equity. 
M&M theorem (1963) and pecking order theory suggest preference of debts over equities, but 
static trade-off theory opposes to extreme usage of debts. As long as the problem of higher costs 
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of equity is addressed, a bank would be more willing to rely more on equity financing, reducing 
its leverage ratio. Together with the increasing number of shareholders when banks foster equity 
financing, paying dividends is costly. Debt holders may see it as an appropriation of their wealth 
to equity holders when managers substitute retained earning with higher dividend payments, 
reducing their interests when lending to banks. This may be an explanation for the inverse 
relation between dividend and leverage as found.  
(iii) Size 
Statistics shows that there is insufficient evidence to reject the explanatory power and the 
positive impact of size on leverage ratios of banks in all examined countries. This result is the 
same as conclusion from Gropp and Heider (2007) and Octavia and Brown (2010). Similar to the 
case of non-financial firms, this can be explained by the trade-off theory. Usually considered as 
good banks, large banks can more easily attract deposits from individuals and corporations. “Too 
big to fail”, large banks are supposed to have lower bankruptcy costs hence have tendency to rely 
more on debts as very cheap source of financing. The lower costs of debts for banks come 
directly from the lower risk premium brought by deposit insurance and more indirectly from the 
benefits of tax shield.   
The magnitude of bank size on its capital mix decision is statistically, but slightly, 
different between two country groups, in which it is more important in determining the capital 
structure decision of banks in developed countries.  
(iv) Asset risk 
Asset risk is consistently statistically significant and negatively related to leverage, both 
book and market values of banks in all countries, regardless of economic development stage. 
This finding is the same as the two previous papers on determinants of banks’ capital structure. It 
is supported by agency theory and static trade-off theory, where leverage ratios are reduced for 
risky banks given agency costs from asset substitution effects are greater than benefits of debts 
as a mitigation tool against managerial discretion. Additionally, costs of bankruptcy outweigh 
benefits of tax shields. 
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Risky banks are also under pressure of reducing debt ratio as imposed by regulatory 
minimum capital requirements. The higher the risk level is, the more risk-weighted assets are, 
resulting in higher capital ratio to be required and lower leverage ratio simultaneously. So 
reducing debt financing is not only a preference but a must for banks when in high risk level, 
complying with regulations in banking sector. 
The absolute values of coefficients are much higher for banks in advanced economies, 
indicating that asset risks are more important in capital structure decision of these banks. This 
may result from the fact that banks in developed countries are more closely and strictly regulated 
by their national Central Banks besides the international standards by Basel Accords. According 
to a report released on October 2012 by World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 
Augusto Lopez-Claros - Director of Global Indicators and Analysis, World Bank Group stated 
that “Over the years, governments (in developing countries) have made important strides to 
improve their business regulatory environment and to narrow the gap with global best practices”, 
however they still have many things to do to improve the national regulation systems. As such, 
banks in emerging countries are less influenced by regulations on their capital ratios in relation 
to volatility in asset risks as opposed to those in more economically developed countries. 
(v) M/B 
M/B ratio proves its importance in explaining capital structure decision of banks in all 
countries, but its signs of correlation with book leverage and market leverage are conflicting. It is 
positively related to book leverage, but inversely to market leverage. Octavia and Brown (2010) 
has exactly the same results when examining developing countries, while banks in advanced 
nations per Gropp and Heider (2007) show only negative relation between M/B and market 
leverage and no statistical significance with book leverage.  
M/B different from 1 implies a different valuation of bank value by the market and the 
bank itself. Octavia and Brown (2010) explains the positive relation between M/B and book 
leverage based on pecking order theory. The more M/B different from 1, the more serious the 
information asymmetry between outsiders and bank insiders is, which results in higher costs of 
equity. Banks would prefer debts, making the book leverage higher. 
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Regarding the negative correlation between M/B and market leverage, we think that 
market timing theory can help explain. High M/B implies that a bank is more highly valued by 
the market than its real value as indicated by the book figure. According to market timing theory, 
when shares are believed to be overvalued, banks would issue equities to take advantage of this 
mispricing. This action would reduce the reliance on debts, increase the market value of bank 
assets, hence lower the market leverage accordingly. 
Comparing the coefficients, it can be seen that magnitude of M/B on determining 
leverage ratios of banks in less developed countries are statistically and much higher than those 
in advanced nations. One possible reason is due to the higher level of information transparency 
in developed economies, making dispersion of market value from book value immaterial. The 
leverage ratios of banks here are thereby less influenced by M/B as compared to those in 
developing countries, where chance of misevaluation is supposed to be higher. 
Another note is that relative to book leverage, the absolute values of coefficients are 
much higher in the regression with market leverage – same with findings of Octavia and Brown 
(2010). They explained that this could reflect the spurious correlation resulted from having 
market values on both side of the equation. The other argument for which we are of more 
agreement is that growth opportunities reflected by M/B plays a vital role in a forward-looking 
measure that market leverage essentially reflects. 
(vi) Profit 
It is found that profit is only statistically significant (at 1% confidence level) in 
explaining leverage ratios for banks in less developed countries. The sign of correlation is 
negative and the very high coefficients shows its ultimate importance in determining the debt 
ratio of these banks, but interestingly not for those in advanced countries. The negative relation 
between profit and leverage ratio can be explained quite directly by the pecking order theory. A 
profitable bank is more likely to utilize its retention before taking debts - the considered-to-be 
more expensive financing source. Moreover, high profit may act as a positive signal to investors, 
encouraging them to invest in the banks. From that, a profitable bank would have an easier 
access to equity financing at lower costs hence may lower the leverage ratio.  
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Our concern is why is there little evidence showing that profit impacts capital structure 
decision of banks in Asian developed countries? The related paper by Gropp and Heider (2007) 
examining banks in Western developed countries also concludes statistical significance and 
negative impact of profit on bank leverage in these countries. Is this non-relatedness due to the 
heavy reliance of a bank on debts for its ongoing operation of meeting the loan demand? If based 
on this argument, we believe that it should be more proper to explain for banks in developing 
countries – which are more of the nature of commercial banking, not for those in developed 
countries with more diversified channels of operation. Given this, we have to question the 
reliability of this result, for which the limited data in the sample may cause. Further studies in 
this regards are expected in the future. 
5.2.2. Country-level determinants 
(i) GDP Growth 
GDP growth is statistically insignificant in all tests except for the test against market 
leverage of banks in developed countries. It is significant at 1% confidence level, showing a 
negative relation with the market leverage of the developed countries. GDP growth rate signifies 
a flourishing economics scenario, with new and profitable investment opportunities available in 
the economy. Individuals and corporations having alternative means of investment will withdraw 
their deposits from banks, making the debt account of banks reduced. At the same time, banks 
have to cater the increasing loan demand and also want to raise capital for their own investments. 
This may lead banks to increase their reliance in equity financing, which further decreases the 
leverage ratios. 
According to Ozcan (2012) large banks are more responsive towards economic cycles 
while smaller banks display an inconsequential relationship. As mentioned when analyzing Table 
4, banks in developed countries are much bigger in size as compared to the banks in developing 
countries. It can help explain the difference in the significance of GDP growth between two 
groups of countries, where GDP shows no impact on the banks’ leverage in developing 
countries. Octavia and Brown (2010) examining determinants of banks’ capital structure in 
emerging countries also suggests that GDP depicts an insignificant impact on bank leverage.  
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(ii) Inflation 
The test on influence of inflation on bank leverage has shown statistical insignificance for 
all the countries included in the model. This is the same as the findings of Santoni (1986) and 
Gropp and Heider (2007).  
Inflation impacts the discount rates on both borrowing and lending. As explained by Ali 
(2011), in response to the inflationary pressure the national central banks would adjust discount 
rates and tighten the monetary policy to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in the credit market of an 
economy, trying to neutralize the impact of inflation on the interest rates. This limits the impact 
of inflation on the amounts of banks’ deposits and loans, minimizing any changes on capital 
structure. 
(iii) Stock market risk 
The empirical findings for market risk illustrate that it has a significant impact at 5%t and 
1% confidence level for the book and market leverage, respectively, of banks only in 
economically developed countries.  The data also shows that market risk has a positive relation 
with the bank leverage, which is opposite to previous finding by Gropp and Heider (2007). One 
possible explanation is that increasing market risk induces higher uncertainty for the investors. 
They would be more hesitant in all channels of investment, prefer keeping money in banks until 
the market volatility is reduced.  As mentioned by Angora et al (2009), banks operate in a highly 
competitive environment. This would result in attracting more deposits for the banks especially 
in the scenario of the rising market instability.  
For banks in developing countries, there is insufficient evidence that market risk has 
explanatory power on their leverage ratios. Our finding is consistent with that of Octavia and 
Brown (2010). They explained this as a result of including both cross sectional and period fixed 
effects in the model. 
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(iv) Term structure spread  
Term structure spread is statistically significant at 1% confidence level for bank leverage 
in only developed countries, showing a negative impact. This is, however, opposite of the 
positive relation as found by Gropp and Heider (2007). 
Higher term structure implies the higher risk premium as compared to the risk free rate, 
resulting in higher costs of debts for banks. The preference on debts would reduce accordingly, 
which may account for the lower leverage ratio of banks. 
In our opinion, the finding that term structure spread does not explain capital structure of 
banks in developing countries may be explained by the difference in the businesses as mentioned 
earlier. Banks in emerging countries are of more nature of commercial banking with ultimate 
function of accepting deposits and lending. Hence, they have to rely heavily on deposits as the 
main source of financing irrespective of the changing costs resulted from changes in term 
structure spread. 
(v) Tax rate      
Tax rate has shown to be statistically significant at 1% confidence level for both market 
and book leverage of banks in developing countries only, depicting a positive impact.  This is in 
line with the findings of numerous studies, including Keen et al (2012) and Wieshi Gu Et al 
(2012). It can be explained referring to M&M theorem (1963) where the corporate financial 
notion of tax shield is highlighted. When taxes are involved, it is cheaper for the banks to switch 
to higher leverage ratios, utilizing tax benefits of debts.  
The non-significant impact of tax rate on bank leverage in developed countries as 
compared to significant influence for that in developing countries can be explained by trade-off 
theory. As can be seen in our Table 4, the mean value of tax rates in developing countries is 
higher than advanced economies. This may imply the more important role of taxes in 
determining capital structure of banks in emerging countries, as the benefits of tax shields with 
higher tax rates are supposed to be higher than agency costs of debts.  
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6. Conclusion 
The serious consequences of previous financial crises highlight the importance of 
supervision, especially in the banking sector. In order for a proper legislation system to be 
implemented, it is vital to have a thorough understanding about the operation of banks in general 
and determinants of their capital structure specifically. As raised by Berger et al. (2008), 
“Without understanding bank’s observed capital levels and capital cushions, it is hard to predict 
how they will respond to economic or supervisory changes”. This motivated us to conduct our 
paper in this field, examining determinants of bank leverage, at both bank and country levels 
with a closer look at Asian region. 
As per our findings, the difference in banks’ leverage ratios between countries is proven 
to be statistically significant. It is believed that the disparity in the capital structures of banks 
depends upon the economic growth stage of the countries where they operate.  
Regarding the determinants, we find that factors which have been proved to affect the 
capital structure in previous papers also have explanatory power in our tests against bank 
leverage ratios. All the variables included in our model can more or less explain changes in the 
capital mix of all the examined banks, except for inflation. Examining the bank-specific 
determinants, there are only some differences in terms of these factors’ significances. Collateral 
is observed to be significant in determining the capital mix of banks of developed countries only, 
whereas profit is a factor of significant importance for merely that of banks in developing 
countries. The results depict that the macroeconomic factors show more variations in influencing 
capital structures of banks in different countries. Tax is the only indicator that explains the 
capital ratios of banks in emerging countries, while the remaining factors are insignificant. 
Country-level determinants have shown to be more impactful on the capital structure of banks in 
advanced countries with the statistical significances of GDP, market risk and term structure 
spread. Drawing conclusion from the behavior of the macroeconomic factors, this strengthens the 
above mentioned observation of the existing difference between the capital structures of banks in 
developed and developing countries.  
Mooij, Keen and Orihara (2013) shows that there exists a positive link between bank 
leverage and financial crisis. Thereby, the determinants of banks’ capital structure should be 
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taken into account carefully when drafting policies to mitigate their financial instability by 
imposing statutory capital requirements. According to Claessens et al. (2010), regulatory 
shortcomings have fueled up the global crisis. It concludes that regulatory authorities should 
provide incentives to the banks to negate the impact of the macroeconomic shocks. It implies that 
certain policies should focus not only on the bank specific factors but also the macroeconomic 
indicators. Together with our findings, it is recommendable that while establishing policies on 
banking sector, the authorities should also consider the economic development stage of different 
countries for a more properly applicable supervision system. We expect that this would 
contribute somehow to decision-making of bank managers as well as policymakers not only in 
Asia but worldwide also. Moreover, it is our hope that the paper will raise interest for further 
researches in the future as well. 
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APPENDIX I: List of countries by population 2011 
Source: World Bank database 
  Rank Economy (thousands)     Rank Economy (thousands)   
          CRI 118 Costa Rica 4 727   
CHN 1 China 1 344 130   IRL 119 Ireland 4 576   
IND 2 India 1 241 492   CAF 120 Central African Republic 4 487   
USA 3 United States 311 592   GEO 121 Georgia 4 486 a 
IDN 4 Indonesia 242 326   NZL 122 New Zealand 4 405   
BRA 5 Brazil 196 655   HRV 123 Croatia 4 403   
PAK 6 Pakistan 176 745   LBN 124 Lebanon 4 259   
NGA 7 Nigeria 162 471   COG 125 Congo, Rep. 4 140   
BGD 8 Bangladesh 150 494   LBR 126 Liberia 4 129   
RUS 9 Russian Federation 142 960   WBG 127 West Bank and Gaza 3 927   
JPN 10 Japan 127 817   BIH 128 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 752   
MEX 11 Mexico 114 793   PRI 129 Puerto Rico 3 707   
PHL 12 Philippines 94 852   PAN 130 Panama 3 571   
VNM 13 Vietnam 87 840   MDA 131 Moldova 3 559 b 
ETH 14 Ethiopia 84 734   MRT 132 Mauritania 3 542   
EGY 15 Egypt, Arab Rep. 82 537   URY 133 Uruguay 3 369   
DEU 16 Germany 81 798   ALB 134 Albania 3 216   
IRN 17 Iran, Islamic Rep. 74 799   ARM 135 Armenia 3 100   
TUR 18 Turkey 73 640   LTU 136 Lithuania 3 030   
THA 19 Thailand 69 519   OMN 137 Oman 2 846   
ZAR 20 Congo, Dem. Rep. 67 758   KWT 138 Kuwait 2 818   
FRA 21 France 65 434   MNG 139 Mongolia 2 800   
GBR 22 United Kingdom 62 744   JAM 140 Jamaica 2 707   
ITA 23 Italy 60 724   NAM 141 Namibia 2 324   
ZAF 24 South Africa 50 587   LSO 142 Lesotho 2 194   
KOR 25 Korea, Rep. 49 779   MKD 143 Macedonia, FYR 2 064   
MMR 26 Myanmar 48 337   LVA 144 Latvia 2 058   
COL 27 Colombia 46 927   SVN 145 Slovenia 2 053   
TZA 28 Tanzania 46 218   BWA 146 Botswana 2 031   
ESP 29 Spain 46 175   QAT 147 Qatar 1 870   
UKR 30 Ukraine 45 706   KSV 148 Kosovo 1 803   
KEN 31 Kenya 41 610   GMB 149 Gambia, The 1 776   
ARG 32 Argentina 40 765   GNB 150 Guinea-Bissau 1 547   
POL 33 Poland 38 534   GAB 151 Gabon 1 534   
DZA 34 Algeria 35 980   TTO 152 Trinidad and Tobago 1 346   
AFG 35 Afghanistan 35 320   EST 153 Estonia 1 340   
UGA 36 Uganda 34 509   BHR 154 Bahrain 1 324   
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CAN 37 Canada 34 484   MUS 155 Mauritius 1 286   
SDN 38 Sudan 34 318   TMP 156 Timor-Leste 1 176   
IRQ 39 Iraq 32 962   CYP 157 Cyprus 1 117   
MAR 40 Morocco 32 273   SWZ 158 Swaziland 1 068   
NPL 41 Nepal 30 486   DJI 159 Djibouti 906   
PER 42 Peru 29 400   FJI 160 Fiji 868   
UZB 43 Uzbekistan 29 341   GUY 161 Guyana 756   
VEN 44 Venezuela, RB 29 278   COM 162 Comoros 754   
MYS 45 Malaysia 28 859   BTN 163 Bhutan 738   
SAU 46 Saudi Arabia 28 083   GNQ 164 Equatorial Guinea 720   
GHA 47 Ghana 24 966   MNE 165 Montenegro 632   
YEM 48 Yemen, Rep. 24 800   MAC 166 Macao SAR, China 556   
PRK 49 Korea, Dem. Rep. 24 451   SLB 167 Solomon Islands 552   
MOZ 50 Mozambique 23 930   SUR 168 Suriname 529   
AUS 51 Australia 22 324   LUX 169 Luxembourg 518   
ROM 52 Romania 21 385   CPV 170 Cape Verde 501   
MDG 53 Madagascar 21 315   MLT 171 Malta 416   
LKA 54 Sri Lanka 20 869   BRN 172 Brunei Darussalam 406   
SYR 55 Syrian Arab Republic 20 820   BLZ 173 Belize 357   
CIV 56 Côte d'Ivoire 20 153   BHS 174 Bahamas, The 347   
CMR 57 Cameroon 20 030   MDV 175 Maldives 320   
AGO 58 Angola 19 618   ISL 176 Iceland 319   
CHL 59 Chile 17 270   BRB 177 Barbados 274   
BFA 60 Burkina Faso 16 968   PYF 178 French Polynesia 274   
NLD 61 Netherlands 16 693   NCL 179 New Caledonia 254   
KAZ 62 Kazakhstan 16 559   VUT 180 Vanuatu 246   
NER 63 Niger 16 069   WSM 181 Samoa 184   
MLI 64 Mali 15 840   GUM 182 Guam 182   
MWI 65 Malawi 15 381   LCA 183 St. Lucia 176   
GTM 66 Guatemala 14 757   STP 184 São Tomé and Principe 169   
ECU 67 Ecuador 14 666   CHI 185 Channel Islands 154   
KHM 68 Cambodia 14 305   CUW 186 Curaçao 146   
ZMB 69 Zambia 13 475   FSM 187 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 112   
SEN 70 Senegal 12 768   VIR 188 Virgin Islands (US) 110   
ZWE 71 Zimbabwe 12 754   VCT 189 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
109   
TCD 72 Chad 11 525   ABW 190 Aruba 108   
GRC 73 Greece 11 300   GRD 191 Grenada 105   
CUB 74 Cuba 11 254   TON 192 Tonga 105   
BEL 75 Belgium 11 021   KIR 193 Kiribati 101   
RWA 76 Rwanda 10 943   ATG 194 Antigua and Barbuda 90   
TUN 77 Tunisia 10 674   ADO 195 Andorra 86   
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PRT 78 Portugal 10 557   SYC 196 Seychelles 86   
CZE 79 Czech Republic 10 496   IMY 197 Isle of Man 83   
SSD 80 South Sudan 10 314   ASM 198 American Samoa 70   
GIN 81 Guinea 10 222   DMA 199 Dominica 68   
HTI 82 Haiti 10 124   BMU 200 Bermuda 65   
BOL 83 Bolivia 10 088   MNP 201 Northern Mariana Islands 61   
DOM 84 Dominican Republic 10 056   GRL 202 Greenland 57   
HUN 85 Hungary 9 972   CYM 203 Cayman Islands 57   
SOM 86 Somalia 9 557   MHL 204 Marshall Islands 55   
BLR 87 Belarus 9 473   KNA 205 St. Kitts and Nevis 53   
SWE 88 Sweden 9 449   FRO 206 Faeroe Islands 49   
AZE 89 Azerbaijan 9 173   TCA 207 Turks and Caicos Islands 39   
BEN 90 Benin 9 100   SXM 208 Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 37   
BDI 91 Burundi 8 575   LIE 209 Liechtenstein 36   
AUT 92 Austria 8 424   MCO 210 Monaco 35   
CHE 93 Switzerland 7 912   SMR 211 San Marino 32   
ARE 94 United Arab Emirates 7 891   MAF 212 St. Martin (French part) 31   
ISR 95 Israel 7 766   PLW 213 Palau 21   
HND 96 Honduras 7 755   TUV 214 Tuvalu 10   
BGR 97 Bulgaria 7 348   WLD   World 6 974 243   
SRB 98 Serbia 7 259             
HKG 99 Hong Kong SAR, China 7 072   Notes: 
a. Excludes Abkhazia and South Ossetia.   
b. Excludes Transnistria. 
PNG 100 Papua New Guinea 7 014             
TJK 101 Tajikistan 6 977     LIC Low income 816 818   
PRY 102 Paraguay 6 568     MIC Middle income 5 022 403   
LBY 103 Libya 6 423     LMC   Lower middle income 2 532 742   
LAO 104 Lao PDR 6 288     UMC   Upper middle income 2 489 661   
SLV 105 El Salvador 6 227     LMY Low & middle income 5 839 221   
JOR 106 Jordan 6 181     EAP   East Asia & Pacific 1 974 219   
TGO 107 Togo 6 155     ECA   Europe & Central Asia 408 141   
SLE 108 Sierra Leone 5 997     LAC 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean 
589 015   
NIC 109 Nicaragua 5 870     MNA 
  Middle East & North 
Africa 
336 540   
DNK 110 Denmark 5 571     SAS   South Asia 1 656 465   
KGZ 111 Kyrgyz Republic 5 515     SSA   Sub-Saharan Africa 874 841   
ERI 112 Eritrea 5 415     HIC High income 1 135 022   
SVK 113 Slovak Republic 5 398     EMU   Euro area 332 931   
FIN 114 Finland 5 388             
SGP 115 Singapore 5 184             
TKM 116 Turkmenistan 5 105             
NOR 117 Norway 4 953             
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APPENDIX II: List and category of Asian countries 
Source: World Bank 
 
No.  Name Rank Note 
 
No.  Name Rank Note 
1 Afghanistan 3   
 
36 Philippines 2   
2 Armenia  2 * 
 
37 Qatar 1   
3 Azerbaijan 2+ * 
 
38 Russia 2+ * 
4 Bahrain 1   
 
39 Saudi Arabia 1   
5 Bangladesh 3   
 
40 Singapore 1   
6 Bhutan 2   
 
41 Sri Lanka 2   
7 Brunei 1   
 
42 South Korea 1   
8 Burma (Myanmar)  3   
 
43 Syria  2   
9 Cambodia 3   
 
44 Taiwan (ROC) 1   
10 China (PRC) 2+   
 
45 Tajikistan 3   
11 Cyprus  1 * 
 
46 Thailand 2+   
12 East Timor  2   
 
47 Turkey  2+ * 
13 Georgia 2 * 
 
48 Turkmenistan 2+   
14 Hong Kong 1 **  
 
49 United Arab Emirates 1   
15 India 2   
 
50 Uzbekistan 2   
16 Indonesia 2   
 
51 Vietnam 2   
17 Iran  2+   
 
52 Yemen  2   
18 Iraq  2   
    19 Israel  1   
 
Note: 
 
20 Japan 1   
 
1 
Developed country: GNI per capita is above 
$12,476  
21 Jordan 2+   
 
2+ Upper-middle income country: GNI per capita  
22 Kazakhstan 2+ * 
  
is $4,036 and $12,475 
23 Kuwait 1   
 
2 Lower-middle income country: GNI per capita 
24 Kyrgyzstan  2     
 
 is $1,026 to $4,035 
25 Laos 2   
 
3 
Developing country: GNI per capita is below 
$1,025  
26 Lebanon 2+   
  
Low-income and middle-income economies  
27 Macau 1 **  
  
are sometimes referred to as developing economies 
28 Malaysia 2+   
 
* Countries which lie in two continents 
29 Maldives 2+   
 
** Territory/ Region only, not a country 
30 Mongolia 2   
     31 Nepal 3   
    32 North Korea 2   
    33 Oman 1   
    34 Pakistan 2   
    35 Palestine 2           
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APPENDIX III: Definition of variables 
 
Book leverage = 1- (book value of equity/book value of assets) 
Market leverage = 1- (market value of equity ( = number of shares ∗ end of year stock 
price)/market value of bank ( = market value of equity + book value of liabilities)) 
Size = book value of assets 
Profits = Net profits/Book value of assets
 10
 
Market-to-book ratio = market value of assets/Book value of assets 
Collateral = (Total assets – Loans)/Book value of assets 11 
Dividend dummy = one if the bank pays a dividend in a given year 
Asset risk = annualised standard deviation of daily stock price returns ∗ (market value of 
equity/market value of bank). 
GDP growth = annual percentage change of gross domestic product 
Stock market risk = annualised standard deviation of daily national stock market index return 
Term structure spread = xx year interest rate – yy month interest rate on government bonds12 
Inflation = annual percentage change in average consumer price index 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Profits = (pre-tax profit + interest expenses)/book value of assets as in Gropp and Heider’s paper 
11
 Collateral = (total securities + treasury bills + other bills + bonds + CDs + cash and due from banks + land and 
buildings + other tangible assets)/book value of assets as in Gropp and Heider’s paper 
12
 Term structure spread = 10 year interest rate – 3 month interest rate on government bonds as in Gropp and 
Heider’s paper 
 
MSC THESIS [DETERMINANTS OF BANK CAPITAL STRUCTURE] 
 
Spring 2013 Page 52 
 
APPENDIX IV: Sources of data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source
Collateral Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
Dividend Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
Size Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
Asset risk Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
M/B Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
Profit Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
GDP growth World Bank and CIA World Factbook database
Inflation World Bank and CIA World Factbook database
Market risk Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
Term structure spread World Bank and Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
Tax World Bank and KPMG databases
Bank-
level 
factors
Country-
level 
factors
Variable
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